University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Global Center for
Business and Development Annual Symposium

Judicial Independence Symposium — October
2005

Oct 28th, 9:15 AM - 10:30 AM

Commentary and Discussion
Troy Paredes
Washington University School of Law

Bruce Janigian
American University of Armenia

Michael P. Malloy
University of the Pacific

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/global-center-symposium
Part of the Law Commons

Paredes, Troy; Janigian, Bruce; and Malloy, Michael P., "Commentary and Discussion" (2005). McGeorge
School of Law Global Center for Business and Development Annual Symposium. 3.
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/global-center-symposium/october-2005/event/3

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Symposia and Conferences
at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Global Center for Business
and Development Annual Symposium by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

The Importance of Corporate Law: Some Thoughts on
Developing Equity Markets in Developing Economies
Troy Paredes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing the right legal system is a fundamental challenge when attempting to
promote economic growth in a developing country. Although a country’s entire legal
infrastructure matters, I want to reflect on this challenge in the specific context of
corporate law.
In recent years, a prominent strategy offered to encourage economic
development has been to shore up the rights of shareholders. Why stress shareholder
rights? There are two primary links in this approach to promoting economic growth.
First, as studies have confirmed, a relationship exists between thick and deep equity
markets and economic growth.1 Simply stated, business enterprises are more likely to
grow and prosper if financial capital is available. The second link in the analysis is
that investors will be reluctant to invest in equities if they are not adequately
protected from abuse at the hands of directors and officers (i.e., insiders) and
controlling shareholders. Turning this statement around, investors will be more
willing to invest, and will do so at higher valuations, if they are sufficiently confident
that their wealth will not be expropriated. Accordingly, for developing countries, the
basic policy argument has been to adopt reforms that protect shareholders in order to
foster equity markets. But what particular reforms are required to foster equity
markets? This is the question on which I want to focus my attention. In doing so, I
take for granted that equity markets stimulate economic development and that
promoting equity markets is a worthwhile policy goal, as compared to, say, simply
focusing on developing credit markets and a viable banking system.
The so-called “law matters thesis” captures one set of particular policy
suggestions for promoting equity markets as a means of economic growth.2 The work

* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. The following is an edited version of the
remarks Professor Paredes made at the Symposium on Judicial Independence and Legal Infrastructure hosted by
the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in October 2005. A more complete discussion of the
topics covered here is available at Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform:
Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004) and Troy A.
Paredes, Corporate Governance and Economic Development, REGULATION, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 34-39, Spring
2005.
1. See generally Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 831-38 (2001); Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence:
Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1660-95 (2002); Frank B. Cross, Law and
Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1769-70 (2002).
2. For some of the seminal work behind the “law matters thesis,” see Rafael La Porta et al., Agency
Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113
(1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
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that the thesis is rooted in shows a link between “more law” (i.e., stronger legal
protections for shareholders) and robust equity markets (i.e., more initial public
offerings (“IPOs”), higher stock market valuations, more listed companies trading on
stock markets, etc.). In most cases, the reality is that directors and officers (the
management team) have control over most decisions affecting the company. If a
controlling shareholder exists, that shareholder may also exert a great deal of
influence, and for all intents and purposes, may run the business through its chosen
representatives on the board and in senior executive positions.
The “law matters thesis” responds to this form of business organization, which is
characterized by a corporate structure whereby shareholders entrust their money to
agents in hopes that they will put the capital to work profitably on the shareholders’
behalf. Since noncontrolling shareholders do not typically run the company day-today, the “law matters thesis” argues for legal protections that shield such
shareholders from abusive practices at the hands of those insiders and controlling
shareholders who do run the business. For example, the law may protect shareholders
from the following: excessive executive compensation; insiders’ placing friends and
family in high-ranking positions; self-dealing transactions involving management;
theft; and shirking by executives.
Reduced to its essence, the “law matters thesis” is about strong shareholder
property rights, as reflected in the control that shareholders are allocated over the
enterprise and the legal limitations that constrain managerial and directorial
discretion; all of which point in the direction of ensuring that shareholders do not
have their wealth expropriated. As hinted at above, if shareholders do not have
adequate control over the enterprise, and if managers and directors are not hemmed
in when running the business, shareholders cannot rely on their financial rights
bearing any fruit, even if the company is successful.
II. IMPLEMENTING THE “LAW MATTERS THESIS”
The “law matters thesis,” however, inevitability leads to a key difficulty: one
cannot just call for “more law” as a policy prescription. One needs to ask, “What
law?” In practice, this becomes a question of what type of corporate governance
system a developing country should have to encourage investors to hold equities.
Put differently, what kind of corporate governance system in a developing
country is most likely to result in the kind of separation of ownership and control
seen in the United States, where there is widespread external financing and
widely dispersed share ownership?3
In considering the “what law?” question, it is important to note a
shortcoming with many of the economic studies behind the “law matters thesis.”

3. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by
Widely Held Public Companies, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE
L.J. 1 (2001).
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Many of the factors that the “law matters” studies stress, such as whether
shareholders can vote by mail, the possibility of cumulative voting, and how
many shares are required to call a special shareholders meeting, do not matter
much in protecting shareholders. More generally, the “law matters thesis” tends
to often focus too narrowly on the formal rules of the game when there are other
relevant factors beyond the formal rules. Indeed, some economic studies
advancing the “law matters thesis” have broadened the focus to include factors
such as enforcement, norms, culture, respect for the rule of law, and the
efficiency of the judicial system that contribute to shareholder protection. When
added to the law on the books, the result is a more complete measure of the
extent to which the legal infrastructure shores up shareholder rights.
In thinking about which corporate law best protects shareholders, it is helpful
to start by identifying two competing models of corporate law that policymakers
can choose from in setting the contours of shareholder rights. The first model is
part of a market-oriented approach to corporate governance. Under this approach,
corporate law is enabling in that it consists largely of default rules that parties can
opt out of to privately order their affairs as they see fit. In this view, corporate
law plays a relatively limited role in protecting shareholders, and defers to a host
of other formal and informal mechanisms to hold managers and directors
accountable, such as incentive-based compensation, product-market competition,
and hostile takeovers. Further, it is also expected that directors and officers will
follow norms of good governance as they try to “do the right thing” even when
they are not required by law to do so. The United States (or rather, Delaware, the
most important state when it comes to corporate law) exemplifies this approach.
The second model encompasses mandatory corporate law, in which the state, as
opposed to the market, plays a central role in shoring up shareholder protections
by fashioning mandatory, clear-cut rules that define shareholder rights.
Which corporate law model should developing countries follow? Asked
differently, to what extent should the government displace the market with more
substantive regulation of corporate governance in developing countries? Even in
the aftermath of the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and elsewhere, the
United States remains the poster child of dispersed share ownership, as
characterized by the so-called “Berle and Means” firm, where ownership and
control are separated. Consequently, the tendency is to look to the United States
for guidance when considering the corporate law regimes of developing
economies. In practice, this means that many argue for the transplantation of
U.S.-style corporate law into developing countries. The rough logic is that if
developing countries import U.S.-style corporate law, they will eventually end up
with U.S. style equity markets.4

4. For more complete analyses of legal transplants, see, for example, Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (2003); Daniel Berkowitz et al., The
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law—
Some Reflections on “Comparative” and “Contrastive” Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 887 (1956); Hideki Kanda &
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A. The U.S. Model of Corporate Law
In my view, the U.S. model of corporate law (and of corporate governance in
general) is the wrong approach for developing countries. Simply stated, corporate
law in Delaware affords shareholders weak protections from insider and controlling
shareholder abuses. It is not much of an overstatement to say that the Delaware
Corporation Code is largely beside the point when it comes to protecting
shareholders, and the fiduciary duties that the Delaware judiciary imposes on
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders are modest, for the most part policing
only egregious conduct. Even if a country wants a corporate law regime similar to
that of the United States, it will miss its mark by a long shot if it simply adopts
something similar to the Delaware Corporation Code. The Delaware Corporation
Code does not include judge-made fiduciary standards that are primarily responsible
for constraining insider and controlling shareholder behavior in the United States.
To be clear, the suggestion that corporate law does not protect shareholders
much in the United States should not be taken to mean that shareholders are not
protected. Moreover, there is virtue in limiting shareholder control over the firm,
even if it means leaving shareholders exposed to opportunism and expropriation.
That is, if there is any value in having directors and officers who manage and oversee
the enterprise, then these individuals need discretion in exercising their authority to
run the business without routine second-guessing or meddlesome interference by
shareholders, let alone by judges or regulators.5
So what makes up U.S. corporate governance? U.S. corporate governance is a
system with many parts that strike a unique balance between managerial discretion
on the one hand, and adequate shareholder protection on the other. Time and space
do not allow for explanation of all the parts of the system in detail and how they fit
together. Therefore, I will briefly highlight select portions.
As noted above, the United States has adopted an enabling approach to corporate
law (premised on private ordering) as opposed to a mandatory approach, and what
matters most for shareholder protection is not the law on the books but the law of
fiduciary duties. Indeed, the most important statutory provision in Delaware is
section 141 of the Delaware Corporation Code, which allocates to the board of
directors, and by extension to corporate officers, control over the corporation’s
business and affairs. The institution of derivative litigation, with easy access to courts
and an active plaintiffs’ bar, is important to provide a means for shareholders to
enforce fiduciary obligations in those limited circumstances in which they are
breached.

Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate
Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003); Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 791 (2002); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effects on Developing Economies,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002).
5. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (developing the director primacy model of corporate governance).
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Markets complement the law. Product markets, the market for capital, the
market for corporate control, and the market for management are said to
discipline directors and officers to profitably run the business in the shareholders’
interests.
Next, contracts help align directors’ and officers’ interests with those of
shareholders. Stock options, restricted stock grants, and other forms of incentive
compensation are common examples of these types of contracts. Also included in
this category of governance mechanism are golden parachutes, which align the
interests of managers and directors with those of shareholders in takeovers. When
a target’s board and senior executives will be ousted if a bid succeeds, the
directors and officers might wish to defeat an unsolicited bid that the
shareholders would like to accept unless these insiders receive a sizable payout
when ousted.6
A number of market players (e.g., stock analysts, institutional investors, and
hedge funds) closely follow the goings-on of companies, and in monitoring an
enterprise and paying attention to company fundamentals, these players can
impact how the business is run. Other important role players that keep tabs on a
firm and its operations include proxy solicitation and shareholder service firms,
such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass, Lewis & Co., and
shareholder watchdog groups like The Corporate Library. Numerous blue-ribbon
panels, including those organized following Enron’s collapse, are also helpful
watchdogs and norm entrepreneurs who shape corporate conduct simply by
taking a stance on how directors and officers should behave. In addition, one
cannot overlook the influence of the financial and business media. Critical
coverage on CNBC or in the Wall Street Journal can affect a company, in part by
shaming management and the board to shape up and reconsider its business plan
and governance structure.7
Although they have received stinging criticism in the aftermath of the Enron
wave of scandals, an array of important gatekeepers, including lawyers,
investment bankers, accountants and auditors, and credit rating agencies fulfill a
constructive governance role. At a minimum, these gatekeepers are expected to
notice red flags indicating corporate malfeasance, such as fraud or looting.
Perhaps the most demanding corporate governance requirements come not
from state corporate law, but from stock market listing standards. Most notably,
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASDAQ burden their listed
companies with a number of requirements. For example, a majority of the
directors at a NYSE- or NASDAQ-listed company must be independent, and the
company must have an audit committee, compensation committee, and
nominating committee solely made up of independent directors.8 Of course,
6. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill:
Adaptive Reponses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 898 (2002).
7. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001).
8. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Standards, 30 SEC.
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companies can avoid these mandates by choosing not to list on the NYSE or
NASDAQ. However, the choice to remain private has its costs for a company,
and is not always a viable option depending on the company’s growth
opportunities and capital needs.
The mandatory disclosure regime under the federal securities laws also bears
mentioning. The mandatory disclosure regime helps ensure that the marketplace
has the information needed to oversee the company’s governance, and to evaluate
whether management’s business plan for the company is successful and worth
pursuing.
Let me take a short step back to Delaware corporate law, as opposed to other
parts of the U.S. corporate governance system, to add a few additional words that
sketch how the Delaware judges work. The Delaware judges are very
sophisticated, and there is a well-established shareholder primacy norm under
Delaware corporate law. At the very least, shareholders know that the Delaware
courts are sensitive to the interests of shareholders, as opposed to the interests of
employees, creditors, or local communities. What is particularly striking about
the Delaware judiciary, though, is that much of what the Delaware judges
achieve in shareholder protection is through dicta and not by holding directors
and officers liable. Indeed, the business judgment rule is very deferential to
executives and the board. Through dicta in their opinions, as well as through their
speeches and articles, the Delaware judges have honed in on the practice of
articulating “aspirations” for good corporate governance—also known as best
practices—which directors and officers routinely follow, even when the
Delaware judges have consistently made it clear that there is no risk of legal
liability for failing to do so.9 Put differently, the Delaware judiciary leverages the
law’s expressive function and the judges’ authoritative standing in corporate
governance matters. The Delaware judges shape corporate behavior simply by
expressing how directors and officers should behave, even when these judicial
aspirations are not backed by any serious risk of legal sanction. This approach to
judicial decisionmaking is purposeful, as it allows the Delaware courts a way to
afford enough protection for shareholders without the courts having to second
guess management and the board in imposing legal liability.

REG. L.J. 370 (2002); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Views From the Bench: The New
Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003); Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and
Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495
(Nancy Rapoport & Bala Dharan eds., 2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); E. Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance
from 1994-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1410-1421 (2005); see
also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms
(Georgetown Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 265902, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract
_id=265902.
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The important point to take away from this brief tour of U.S. corporate
governance is that the U.S. corporate governance system is a complex
institutional mix in which corporate law takes a backseat to other features of the
system in protecting shareholders. In other words, U.S. corporate law is relatively
unimportant to shareholder protection, and yet, the United States has the most
robust equity markets in the world.
B. A Mandatory Model of Corporate Law and Developing Countries
Where does this leave us in considering the “law matters thesis” and related
corporate law reforms for promoting equity markets in developing economies?
One can start to answer this question by asking whether a market-based approach
to corporate governance, such as the one in the United States, is feasible for
developing countries looking to develop equity markets. In my view, the answer
is “no” for a number of reasons. For present purposes, it suffices simply to stress
that the U.S. system presupposes the existence of markets and relies on a host of
non-law market institutions to protect shareholders in place of demanding legal
mandates. When a full complement of such market institutions exists, there is
little need for strong laws to protect shareholders. However, developing countries
do not yet have the mature market institutions that make a market-based model of
governance with weak legal protections guarding shareholders feasible. Indeed,
the whole endeavor is to create markets.10 A related shortcoming is that the
standardized contracting and “shared mental model” of governance and business
that shape parties’ reasonable expectations in developed markets are often
lacking in developing economies.11 These are important parts of a market-based
model of corporate governance because, by getting market participants and
corporate actors on the same page, standardized contracting and a shared mental
model of governance and business reduce information and transaction costs as
the parties’ bargain to fill the gaps in an enabling corporate law.
If not the U.S. model, what kind of corporate law regime should developing
countries have? Instead of an enabling corporate law, I recommend a much more
mandatory corporate law regime for developing countries that basically fills the
void left by the lack of market institutions in these countries. If the law matters, it
really matters in promoting equity markets in developing economies. In no
particular order, the following is a list of some examples of strong legal
shareholder protections worth considering:
•
•

banning self-interested transactions;
capping executive compensation;

10. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1911, 1913 (1996).
11. Cf. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 362-63
(1994).

407

2007 / The Importance of Corporate Law
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

requiring shareholder approval for significant acquisitions;
mandating the payment of dividends;
granting shareholders a limited put right;
allowing shareholders to adopt proposals binding on management;
giving shareholders the right to nominate directors and to have a
shareholder nominee elected to the board;
allowing shareholders greater discretion in deciding whether to
tender to a hostile bidder (i.e., limiting defensive tactics);
allowing shareholders more freedom to bring suits against directors
and officers (i.e., dispensing with the demand requirement);
requiring shareholder approval to issue shares or bonds in excess of
some threshold;
adopting a strict definition of director “independence,” and requiring
a majority or even a supermajority of independent directors to be on
the board;
adopting director term limits;
limiting the number of shares insiders can buy or sell during a given
period, such as every six months, and requiring that insiders disclose
their planned trades before they take place; and
requiring a certain minimum premium in a transaction whereby a
controlling shareholder proposes to squeeze out the minority
shareholders.
III. CONCLUSION

I have only scratched the surface in considering one aspect of economic
growth—the relationship between shareholder protection and the development of
equity markets. The lessons here, however, are not limited to corporate law. On a
broader landscape, this is a story about institution building and the importance of
having the right blend of formal and informal institutions to achieve a society’s
12
goals. In short, a country’s overall institutional mix matters to its prosperity.
It is not enough to say that institutions matter, just as it is not enough to say
that law matters. The practical challenge for policymakers is to figure out which
institutions matter under different circumstances. I know it sounds cliché, but one
size does not fit all. As if determining the appropriate blend of legal institutions
is not hard enough, a country’s legal infrastructure itself is but one part of a much

12. See generally DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (John N. Drobak & John V.C.
Nye eds., 1997); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J.
ECON. LIT. 595 (2000).
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more complex system that includes a country’s culture, history, politics, values,
norms, social structure, demographics, and other factors unique to that country.
Consequently, institution building requires subtlety. Whatever strategy is adopted
in trying to promote economic growth, whether it is shoring up shareholder rights
or some other approach, the facts have to be examined on a country-by-country
basis to see what will work in a particular country at a particular time. What
works in country A may fail in country B. Moreover, policymakers must avoid
over-promising the benefits of reform. Economic development is tough business,
and any reform agenda is risky because so many things need to go right for it to
work. It is important for policymakers to avoid setting themselves up for failure
by inflating expectations that then cannot be met. A dose of humility on the part
of policymakers and straight shooting with the public are themselves important
parts of any reform agenda.
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